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I．Introduction
China has achieved great economic growth since the end of the１９７０’s. Especially in recent years, while the
global economy including those of East Asian countries, which used to be the center of development in the
world, has been facing total deflation, China has kept its GDP growth. The Chinese economy is going strong
with its GDP reaching７．５％ in２００１，８．０％ in２００２，９．１％ in２００３and９．７％ in the first quarter of２００４
（China Statistical yearbook２００３，PEOPLE’S DAILY OVERSEAS EDITION January２１and April１６，２００４）．
It should be emphasized that such economic growth is inseparable from the various problems arising in the
process of a transition from a “planned economy” to a “market economy”.
It has been pointed out that, unlike in the case of the centrally planned economy of the former Soviet Union
and Eastern European countries, China had a decentralized planned economy and each province carried out
individual economic reform, which prompted the nation−level reform（Qian, Y., G. Roland, & C. Xu：１９９８）．
That is, the locally controlled production organizations, logistic organizations and retail organizations had
been already systemized and the national−level reform could be started as a partial test and was achieved
uneventfully. A sudden nation−wide transitional economy could bring about huge confusion to the national
economy. In the case of China, the provinces had the authority to manage and control their own production
activities within the national economy, but they had no power over the economic policy planning and
decision−making. The major areas of economic reform, such as the deregulation of the old pricing system,
monetary system, financial system and the deregulation of import/export and foreign capital introduction had
to be carried out under the guidance of the central government. We should consider that the “success” of the
Chinese transitional economy lies in its procedures.
II．Economic performance
Bulgaria, Romania and Russia have not been performing well in their national economies since the start of
their economic reforms and are still suffering at the bottom. On the other hand, in the Czech Republic and
Hungary, the economy recovered and went back to its pre−reform level in１９９５，and so did Slovenia in１９９７．
Although these countries showed signs of recovery, they have not achieved high−level growth yet. China
has been showing a striking difference from Russia and other Eastern European countries, displaying a
８５
straight economic growth since its economic reform in１９７８（Fig．１）．Furthermore, its average GDP growth
rate reached to over９％ between１９７９and２００２，which equaled what used to be the outstanding economic
performances displayed by Japan and other East Asian countries.
FIGURE１．REAL GDP TRENDS IN TRASITION COUNTRIES
Source : China, China Statistical Yearbook, Others, Statistical Yearbook, U.N.
Looking at the production structure by area, Eastern European countries show a clear shift from industry to
the service sector as in Table１．For example, Bulgaria used to have the highest production share in industry
before the economic reform（６２．５％），but it dropped to２７．７％ in２０００．The Czech Republic industrial
production share has the highest figure of４０％ among the Eastern European countries in２０００．On the other
hand, the Chinese industrial production share rose from４３．１％ in１９８５ to５０．９％ in２０００，though its
agricultural production share halved during the same time period. In other words, the rapid growth of Chinese
industry, especially of the manufacturing industry, led the overall Chinese economy for over twenty years
since the start of economic reform（１９７８－２００２）２．
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TABLE１．SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF PRODUCTION
（Percentage shares）
Source : Statistical Yearbook, U.N，１９９６，２００３．
Note：１．１９８７，２０００、２．１９９０，２０００
It is generally understood as a global trend that national economic production activities shift from industry
to the service sector as per capita GDP increases. In this light, it would be inexplicable that the industrial
production share should be relatively low in Eastern European countries in contrast to Korea and Malaysia,
which had a similar level of per capita GDP at that time, assuming that the statistical figures are correct. We
could assume, then, that the phenomenon seen here would have to do with the style of shift taken by the
system and not with the issue of the development level of national economy.
III．Price mechanism and competition principle
The difference between China and Eastern Europe could possibly be attributed to the differences between
the two that already existed at the developmental stage of modern society before the start of transitional
economic. Based on the comparison to leading developing countries such as Korea and Malaysia, however, it
seems inevitable to have a high growth in industry or manufacturing business to maintain high economic
growth. J. Sachs clearly pointed out that high economic growth in China during the transition period is a
product of the adjustment of developmental economic strategies（Sachs, J. & T. Woo：１９９７）．It would also
be worth noting how China created the safety device to guarantee long and stable industrial development or
economic growth. This transition period was also the time when the economic system shifted from the
dismantling of the “controlled planned economy system” to the formation of “market economy system”.
Now, as is well known, the Chinese transitional economy took the style of a “gradualist approach”, which
differs from the Russian and Eastern European “big bang approach”. That is, the Chinese gradual transition is
characterized as the gradual introduction of a market mechanism with the liberalization of the past national
control price system as its main axis and with the shrinkage of nationally controlled production and
１９８５ ２０００ GDP per capita
Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services Current US$,2000
China ２８．４ ４３．１ ２８．５ １５．９ ５０．９ ３３．２ ８６６
Bulgaria １１．９ ６２．５ ２５．６ １４．５ ２７．７ ５７．７ １，５０８
Czech Rep．１ ６．７ ４９．８ ４３．５ ３．９ ４０．０ ５６．１ ４，９２４
Hungary １６．１ ４２．６ ４１．３ ４．１ ３３．９ ６２．０ ４，６４９
Poland２ ８．４ ５４．１ ３７．４ ３．８ ３５．０ ６１．２ ４，０８２
Romania １４．９ ５２．７ ３２．４ １２．５ ３５．８ ５１．７ １，６３５
Russia － － － ７．０ ３８．３ ５４．７ １，７２６
Slovenia ５．１ ４６．０ ４８．９ ３．２ ３７．４ ５９．３ ９，１１８
Korea １２．５ ４１．０ ４６．６ ４．６ ４２．８ ５２．８ ９，７８２
Malaysia １８．７ ４０．０ ４１．２ ８．２ ４８．３ ４２．５ ４，０３５
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distribution as its sub−axis（Ye, Gang：２０００b）. China did not dismantle its nationally controlled price
system, nor did it introduce a free price system all at once, but took the following three methods
simultaneously : first, the style of frequently adjusting the “planned price”, watching the market closely and
raising and lowering the price adequately ; second, the style of introducing a “guided price” partially instead
of a “planned price”, as the former has more flexibility to market change than the latter ; and third, the style
of admitting “free price” for the non−“planned production/distribution” portion. This is called a “dual−track
system”, but the Chinese price system reform did not stop there and ultimately reached to the renouncement
of “planned price” and “guided price”. The sale market share by the free retail price and the free production
price was almost zero in１９７８，when it is seen concretely（Fig．２）．They came to occupy it in４０％ for the
middle of１９８０’s. For example, the same change is being watched for the steel material sale as well.
The sale market share of the steel material by the free price has been growing straightly from１９７９，it came
to occupy it in more than９０％ in１９９５（Fig．２）．They meet more than８０％ when the first of１９９０’s.
Furthermore, the quantity and the period of trading in “free prices” were allowed gradually in the order of
consumer non−durable goods（e.g. clothes and commodities）, consumer durable goods（e.g. household
appliances）, manufacturing equipment and machines, materials（e.g. steel）and raw materials（e.g. coal）
（Cheng, Pingzhi：１９９９）．Such a “dual−track system” could guarantee a smooth transition of product
trading prices and service product prices to total liberalization.
FIGURE２．PRODUCTION GOODS & RETAIL OF SALES AMOUMT BY FREE PRICES
Source : Cheng, Pingzhi（１９９９），p．２２４，Ye, Gang（２０００b）, p．１３７．
Notes : F.R.−Free retail price, F.P.−Free production goods price.
At the same time as the price system reform, China launched a reduction of “controlled planned
production” and the expansion of “non−controlled planned production” of reproductive activities of the
national economy. Naughton termed this method of reform as the “expansion method”（Naughton, B．：
１９９５）．In reality, planned production decreased and stopped relative to the increase of non−“planned
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production”, especially in the areas of industry, wholesale, and retailing businesses. It should be noted that the
recognition of “non−controlled planned production” prompted the entry of non−state−owned sectors and
activated town and village enterprises（TVEs）and private enterprises, many of which came to engage in the
production of consumer goods. Needless to say, as the price of material goods and service goods become
liberalized, the need for a “market” that trades them freely increases. National policies promoted the leasing
of state−owned retail shops and the establishment of the production goods dealings market place and
consumer goods dealings market place one after another, and thereby creating an environment where
enterprises could trade freely. The production and marketing activities of enterprises started with the
combination of planned production and planned distribution, advancing to autonomous production plus
inner−market−place trading, and then to outer−market−place trading（Ye, Gang：２０００a）．This not only
gave TVEs and private enterprises great chances of entry, but also started the restructuring of the management
organization of pre−existing state−owned enterprises with thorough profit management and business
diversification（Ye, Gang：２０００a）．We could consider that this strengthened the management system of
every type of enterprise and increased their competitiveness.
IV．Property and governance of firms
Transition economies had to face reform of the ownership system of goods, land and firms at the same time
as they were introducing a market mechanism. Among other things, the reform of the property system of pre−
existing state−owned companies was both important and hard to carry out. Many Eastern European countries
turned their state−owned company properties into vouchers and sold them to the public. On the other hand,
China chose not to sell state−owned companies, except for small manufacturing firms, but instead of that
separated the state−ownership and the business management. In other words, China allowed the co−existence
of state−ownership, collective−ownership and private ownership of enterprises after its economic reform.
This caused an extreme reduction of the ratio of state−owned enterprises in the national economy. At the end
of２００２，there were２，４３０，０００private firms with registered capital of２，４７５，６００million RMB（Yearbook
of Industry and Commerce Administration of China，２００３），which in comparison with the year１９８９are
approximately３０times and３００times higher, respectively. Also in２００２state−owned enterprises had a４０％
share of the GDP, down from over８０％ in１９８０，whereas private enterprises had a３０％ share（A study on
the development of the private economy in China２００３－２００４，Beijing : China Machine Press，２００３，p．４）．
Looking at the industrial production shares, state−owned enterprises’ share decreased from８８％ in１９７８ to
２２％ in２００２，but non−state−owned enterprises’（including foreign enterprises）share rose to７８％．
Among the non−state−owned enterprises, the ratio of private firms was over２０％ in２００２（China Industry
Economy Statistical Yearbook，２００３）．The enterprises with sales volume of less than５million RMB are
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excluded here.
The fact that the majority of state−owned enterprises were not sold to the public does not mean that no
management reform took place there. The management restructuring of state−owned enterprises was
attempted as the production and the marketing were liberated. State−owned enterprises established their own
independent profit system and the majority of management rights were transferred to them３．It would not be
too much to say that state−owned enterprises as management organizations were reborn, except for some at
the provincial level. However, the formation of a management class, Japanese−style “inner market” of
managers and American−style “outer market” of managers has not matured in China, and the government
appointment system is still prevailing. One such example is seen in the case where the outside management
undertook the reshuffling of the management of some steel enterprises under government guidance （Ye,
Gang：２００２）．It is worth pointing out that, since state−owned enterprises re−emerged as an independent
management body after a series of restructuring, the people and organizations both inside and outside the
enterprise who get affected by enterprise profit started to play their respective roles and adjusted to each
other’s profit.
Few Chinese researchers noticed that the property and governance of private firms were in fact inseparable,
though at first sight private firms, which contributed to economic growth, seemed to destroy the pre−existing
enterprise property structure at the national economy level. Researchers in Mainland China have been arguing
on the separation of property and governance for over ten years, insisting that the separation of property and
governance is only logical in the case of state−owned enterprises. However, the governance of private firms is
considered to pose a bigger problem at present. I carried out interviews with managers or owners of６private
enterprises with２００to１０，０００employees in Wenzhou in March２００４．As for the common point of these six
companies, family, who were also managers there commonly, owned the enterprise. In the company structure
where the owner is also a manager, only the family members are considered as “insiders”, whereas the non−
family member managers and the mid−management are all deemed as “outsiders”. A problem could arise
when the management responsibilities of the family members are not made clear. Large enterprises, e.g.
Oakang Group Co. Ltd., form such organizations as Communist party organizations, labor unions and
employee representative committees that are only seen in state−owned enterprises, but it would be doubtful
whether such organizations could properly function as a monitor.
It is undeniable that state−owned enterprises are losing their ground in terms of their number, capital
volume, and industrial production volume. China needs to change their roles. The term “state−owned
enterprise” might disappear from statistics in the near future, but no matter how they are restructured or how
their stocks go listed according to Company Law, or no matter how their capital is reorganized by joint
venturing with domestic private capitals or foreign capitals, or no matter how their internal organization or
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management is restructured, their fundamental “state” nature has not changed. It would not be too much to
say that national companies still play an important role as they guarantee the national tax income, stabilize
employment, undertake a stable, long−term development of production goods and promote public utility, as
well as acting as a testing station for governmental development policies of a developing industrial country.
This role would be a necessary procedure in accordance with the logic of a gradual transition of economic
reform. On the other hand, private companies would be greatly expected to undertake national economic
reproduction activities in the future, in particular, the expansion of employment.
V. Conclusions
We should not regard China simply as a nation whose regime is transiting from a “controlled planned
economy” to a “market economy”. It should also be noted that China is a developing country actively
promoting the transition from a “traditional society” to a “modern society”. As a result, a big change in
regime would naturally cause great social conflicts. In other words, the bigger the regime change would
become, the more social risks or social costs would increase. This would in turn create an unexpected level of
obstacles, either by forcing the economic system shift to prolong its process to modern society or by
disrupting it. Chinese style gradual transition is effective in minimizing such social risks.
This style has its own continuity and promotes the formation of a market mechanism, by combining the
gradual liberalization of price with the reduction of “planned production/distribution” and the expansion of
“non−planned production/distribution”．At the same time, this gradual approach took into consideration the
relationship between the upstream section and the downstream section of national economic production
activities, linking the distribution system of raw materials, fuel and production goods within their production
process and the distribution systems（both wholesale and retailing）of agricultural products, non−durable
consumer goods and durable consumer goods, according to their priorities through the liberalization of price.
This gradual liberalization of price could avoid a possible rapid expansion of the distribution sector and make
the industrial sector, especially the manufacturing section, to be considered as a stable earner of profit,
thereby prevented the industry from shrinking. Gradual reform at a micro level also contributed to bring down
the social risks and costs in China. China did not sell pre−existing state−owned enterprises to the public
instantaneously, but carried out management restructuring to acquire the ability and the competitiveness to
respond to the environmental change of their social activities and thereby attempted to maintain and further
develop their pre−existing productivity. The non−state−owned sector, which were permitted to enter first
started in a supporting role of state−owned enterprises and later came to support the development of industrial
production and the national economy.
It is well known that human customs and economic behaviors taken by companies and households lie on
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the basis of an institution. Economic behaviors by enterprises, the government and households slowly
changed from “planned” ones to “market−based” ones in China as the gradual transition progressed. This
gradual transition gave time to enterprises, the government, and households to get used to market mechanisms
and diversified forms of ownership. Marshall pointed out this result about eighty years ago : “the institutions
may be changed rapidly ; yet if they are to endure they must be appropriate to man”（Marshall, A．：１９２２）．
Notes :
１ Plans concerning the production activities of the national economy were created by the central government.
The execution, management and control of actual economic activities such as production, distribution and
retail were responsibilities under various central functions（e.g. various industry sections）, provinces, and
cities and counties within provinces.
２ The consumer durable goods section in China, such as household appliances, has been placed as the world’s
largest industry since the late１９９０’s. For example, the numbers of production units for color TVs（４０，９３７
thousand units in２００１），refrigerators（household use）（１３，５１３ thousand units）, washing machines
（household use）（１３，４１６thousand units）achieved No．１ranking in the world in１９９４and has maintained
its position since then till now（in２００１）
３ As of１９９７，national companies acquired most of their management rights from either the central or local
government, such as management planning, price setting, sales and purchasing, wage decisions,
organization establishment, investment, profit disposal, employment, and human resources management.
Approximately６０％ of them are supposed to make autonomous decisions on capital disposal concerning
the quality change of capital and on company mergers and acquisitions.
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